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Over the past several years, the volume of crude oil being transported by rail has 
dramatically increased.  With this increase, the number of train accidents involving crude oil rail 
cars has also increased.  A common perception of the public is that the risk associated with 
“crude-by-rail” has increased.  This may be true due to an increase in rail car shipments but has 
the magnitude of hazards associated with crude by rail transport changed?  Arguments have been 
made that the compositions of specific crudes make them more hazardous than conventional 
crude.  Is there a basis for this claim? 
 
As the volume of crude transported by rail has increased, so has the volume of liquefied 
petroleum gases (LPGs) transported by rail, albeit with different types of rail cars than those used 
for crude oil. 
 
This paper will investigate the magnitude of hazards associated with rail transport of a 
range of crude oils and LPGs.  The release mechanisms will be affected by the type of rail car 
employed (DOT-112, DOT-111, and the modified DOT-111 called the 1232) and the fluid 
condition upon release.  The result of the overall analysis will be a side-by-side comparison of 




 Much of the discussion concerning the risk associated with the rail transport of crude oils 
has centered around the frequency of accidents and not the consequence(s) associated with the 
accidents.  Since the risk (R) associated with rail transportation of crude oil is the product of 
frequency (f) and consequence (C) [R = f • C] a better understanding of the consequences 
associated with releases of crude oil during rail transport is warranted.  This paper provides 
insight into the extent of potential hazards associated with four types of crude oil, three types of 
liquefied petroleum gases (LPGs), and ethanol.  The hazards associated with LPGs and ethanol 
are included in the evaluation in order to put the hazards derived from the crude oils in 
perspective. 
 
 The analysis is targeted at comparing the extent of potential impacts associated with these 
fluids commonly transported by rail.  In order to provide as close to an apples-to-apples 
comparison as possible, a common set of atmospheric conditions, inventory amounts, and release 
hole sizes were used.  In the evaluation, the following parameters were kept constant. 
 
 Atmospheric Conditions 
  Wind speed = 10 miles per hour 
  Atmospheric stability = Pasquill-Gifford class D 
  Relative humidity = 70% 
  Air temperature = 70°F 
  Substrate temperature = 70°F 
  Surface roughness = 1.57 inches [0.04 meters] 
 Inventory Amounts 
  Water capacity of rail cars (DOT-112 and DOT-111) = 33,600 gallons 
  Nominal capacity (full) = 30,000 gallons 
 Release Hole Sizes  
  2-inch diameter hole in liquid phase, orientation = horizontal with the wind 
   Hole assumed to be at midpoint of liquid level 
  2-inch diameter hole in vapor phase, orientation = vertical  
  Catastrophic failure of rail car with immediate ignition 
 
While this set of conditions may not correspond exactly with the products evaluated in 
their associated rail cars, they are close enough to allow the hazard impacts to be compared.  
It should be noted that none of the fluids were defined to have any acutely toxic components 




The rail car used to transport LPGs is defined as a DOT-112 rail car, commonly referred 
to as a pressure car.  The maximum water capacity of this rail car is 33,600 gallons.  Figure 1 
shows a DOT-112 rail car and identifies some of its features.  The DOT-111 rail car is used to 
transport crude oils, ethanol, and other materials.  Figure 2 shows a DOT-111 rail car and some 
of its features.  For this analysis, the water capacity of the DOT-111 rail car was assumed to be 
33,600 gallons.  For evaluating the hazards associated with a release of fluid, the DOT-111 and 
DOT-111 (1232) rail cars are considered the same.  For the purposes of this analysis, the rail cars 







While the capacities of the two rail car types were held constant, the fluid properties of 
the materials transported were not.  Table 1 presents basic information on the eight materials 
evaluated in this study.  It should be noted that the generic LPG listed in the table is a 50/50 mix 
(by moles) of propane and n-butane.  The fluid characteristics of the four example crude oils 
were taken from the Sandia report titled Literature Survey of Crude Oil Properties Relevant to 
Handling and Fire Safety in Transport [1].  It should be noted that slight changes in the 
composition of the crude oil would not significantly change the results.  This will be partially 
addressed by evaluating two Bakken compositions.  One composition, labeled Bakken, has a 
Reid vapor pressure of 7.83 psia, while the other Bakken composition, labeled Bakken-S, has a 




Figure 1.  DOT-112 (Used for LPG) 
 
 












n-Butane Bakken Bakken-S Denver Basin 
Eagle 
Ford Ethanol 
Rail Car Type DOT-112 DOT-112 DOT-112 DOT-111 DOT-111 DOT-111 DOT-111 DOT-111 
Rail Car water capacity (gallons) 33,600 33,600 33,600 33,600 33,600 33,600 33,600 33,600 
Rail Car percent liquid full 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 
Reid Vapor Pressure (psia) NA1 NA2 NA3 7.83 11.3 7.82 7.95 2.31 
Mole Fraction of Light Ends (< 
C5) 1.0 1.0 1.0 ~0.063 ~0.076 ~0.063 ~0.063 NA 
NA1 = vapor pressure of Propane at 100°F is 189 psia 
NA2 = vapor pressure of 50/50 mix (by moles) of Propane and n-Butane at 100°F is 82.5 psia 
NA3 = vapor pressure of n-Butane at 100°F is 52 psia 





The eight materials evaluated in this study are all flammable fluids.  The LPGs are 
transported in rail cars that maintain the fluid in liquid form due to the fluid vapor pressure.  
The crude oils and ethanol are transported in what can be described as near-ambient conditions.  
A release of LPG, crude oil, or ethanol can result in one or more of the following hazards. 
 
• Dispersion of a flammable gas plume, possibly followed by ignition and resultant flash 
fire.  The maximum extent of a flash fire is defined by the distance to the lower 
flammable limit (LFL). 
• Ignition of the vapor or vapor/liquid mix (aerosol), resulting in a torch fire (jet fire).  
The maximum extent of the radiant hazard is defined by the 1,600 Btu/hr-ft2 radiant flux 
level.  
• Ignition of the vapor evolving off a liquid pool following a release, resulting in a pool 
fire.  The maximum extent of the radiant hazard is defined by the 1,600 Btu/hr-ft2 radiant 
flux level.  
• Catastrophic failure of the rail car, followed by immediate ignition of the aerosol mass 
forming a fireball.  The maximum extent of the radiant hazard from the fireball is defined 
by the 1% mortality level associated with an integrated radiant dose (defined by a probit). 
• Overpressure generated by the ignition of the flammable mass generated.  A common 
measure of the extent of overpressure impacts is to define the distance to 1 psig. 
 
While these hazard endpoints do not represent a consistent set (some identify mortality while 





The hazard zones resulting from the liquefied gas, crude oil, and ethanol releases were evaluated 
to determine the extent and location of flammable hazards.  When performing site-specific 
consequence analysis studies, the ability to accurately model the release, dilution, and dispersion 
of gases and aerosols is important if an accurate assessment of potential exposure is to be 
attained.  For this reason, Quest uses a modeling package, CANARY by Quest®, that contains a 
set of complex models that calculate release conditions, initial dilution of the vapor (dependent 
upon the release characteristics), and the subsequent dispersion of the vapor introduced into the 
atmosphere.  The models contain algorithms that account for thermodynamics, mixture behavior, 
transient release rates, gas cloud density relative to air, initial velocity of the released gas, and 
heat transfer effects from the surrounding atmosphere and the substrate.  The release and 
dispersion models contained in the QuestFOCUS package (the predecessor to 
CANARY by Quest®) were reviewed in a United States Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) sponsored study [2] and an American Petroleum Institute (API) study [3].  In both studies, 
the QuestFOCUS software was evaluated on technical merit (appropriateness of models for 
specific applications) and on model predictions for specific releases.  One conclusion drawn by 
both studies was that the dispersion software tended to overpredict the extent of the gas cloud 
travel, thus resulting in too large a cloud when compared to the test data (i.e., a conservative 
approach). 
 
A study prepared for the Minerals Management Service [4] reviewed models for use in modeling 
routine and accidental releases of flammable and toxic gases.  CANARY by Quest® received the 
highest possible ranking in the science and credibility areas.  In addition, the report recommends 
CANARY by Quest® for use when evaluating toxic and flammable gas releases.  The specific 
models (e.g., SLAB) contained in the CANARY by Quest® software package have also been 
extensively reviewed. 
 
CANARY also contains models for pool fire and torch fire radiation.  These models account for 
impoundment configuration, material composition, target height relative to the flame, target 
distance from the flame, atmospheric attenuation (includes humidity), wind speed, and 
atmospheric temperature.  Both are based on information in the public domain (published 
literature) and have been validated with experimental data. 
 
For vapor cloud explosion calculations, Quest uses a model that is a variation of the Baker-
Strehlow-Tang (BST) method.  The Quest model for estimation of flame speeds (QMEFS) [5] 
is based on experimental data involving vapor cloud explosions, and is related to the amount of 
confinement and/or obstruction present in the volume occupied by the vapor cloud. 
 
Consequences Associated with a Release During Ambient Conditions 
 
The first set of consequence calculations were performed as if the accident occurred 
(e.g., a derailment), and assumed 2-inch diameter hole was generated, and the pressure and 
temperature in the rail car was not elevated due to an external fire.  In this manner, the hazards 
associated with the eight fluids can be evaluated based on their thermophysical properties during 
transport. 
 
 It is instructive to review the release rate of the various fluids under these conditions.  
As an example, Figure 3 presents the mass release rate of propane out of a 2-inch hole in the 
liquid space of a DOT-112 rail car.  Since the pressure in the rail car is approximately 126 psia 
(the vapor pressure of propane at 70°F), there is pressure to force the propane out of the hole.  
Upon exiting the hole, the propane flashes and forms an aerosol cloud.  Figure 3 shows how the 
various propane phases (vapor = flashed and evaporated, aerosol liquid = liquid droplets that stay 
suspended in air, liquid to ground = liquid that reaches the ground) are released from the 2-inch 
hole as a function of time. 
 
 Figures 4 and 5 show the release behavior of the 50/50 LPG mixture and the pure 
n-butane respectively.  As would be expected, the mass release rate drops as the pressure in the 
rail car drops (76 psia for the 50/50 LPG mix and 32 psia for the n-butane). 
 
 Releases of the four crude oils and ethanol would show a different behavior.  Since there 
is no pressure to force the liquid out the hole and there is not an additional hole to allow air to 
enter, the liquid can only drop out intermittently.  After each small volume of liquid is released, 
air is drawn back into the rail car.  This method combined with the low pressure of the rail car 
does not generate any significant aerosol or vapor formation.  Thus, almost all of the crude oil 
and ethanol releases end up as pools of liquid on the ground. 
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Figure 5.  Liquid n-Butane Release – Ambient Conditions 
 
Extent of Flash Fires Following a Release from the Liquid Space – Ambient Conditions 
 
 Using the CANARY software, the vapor clouds generated following a liquid release from 
a 2-inch diameter hole in the rail car, oriented horizontally were evaluated.  As described above, 
the liquefied gases demonstrate a different release behavior than the crude oils and ethanol.  This 
is shown in Table 2 where the source of the vapor cloud generating the largest flash fire distance 
is defined. Table 2 also defines the distance to the LFL for each of the fluid releases under the 
ambient (Tair = Tfluid = 70°F) conditions.  As can be seen from Table 2, the liquefied gases 
have the potential to generate significantly larger flash fire zones than any of the crude oils or 
ethanol. 
 
Table 2.  Distance (ft) to LFL Following 










505 450 75 30 30 15 50 10 
MJ MJ MJ Pool Pool Pool Pool Pool 
MJ = Momentum Jet Source 
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Extent of Radiant Impacts Following a Release from the Liquid Space – Ambient 
Conditions 
 
 If the fluid released from the 2-inch hole were to ignite, two potential radiant hazards 
could exist.  If enough vapor were generated to sustain a torch fire, a slowly receding torch flame 
would exist.  The extent of the radiant impacts are presented in Table 3.  Note that under the 
ambient conditions, the crude oils and ethanol are not volatile enough to generate a continuous 
flammable vapor stream leaving the 2-inch hole. 
 
Table 3.  Distance (ft) at Ground Level to 1,600 Btu/hr-ft2 from Torch Fire Following 










215 185 125 NV NV NV NV NV 
NV = Not Volatile Enough to Generate a Torch Fire 
 
 If the fluid leaving the 2-inch hole reaches grade and ignition occurs, a pool fire can 
ensue.  For the crude oils and ethanol this is the primary hazard associated with their release.  
This is shown in Table 4.  The results for the four crude oils are similar as their burning 
characteristics are similar.  Ethanol’s burning characteristics are slightly different, resulting in a 
different radiant impact distance.  Note that the release of propane and the 50/50 LPG mix do not 
result in any significant liquid to ground (see Figures 3 and 4), thus pool fires are not possible.  
The n-butane release does result in liquid to the ground (see Figure 5), thus a pool fire is 
possible. 
 
Table 4.  Distance (ft) to 1,600 Btu/hr-ft2 from Pool Fire Following 










DNE DNE 100 55 55 55 55 65 
DNE = Does Not Exist 
 
Vertical Releases Following a Release from the Vapor Space – Ambient Conditions 
 
 All vertical releases were assumed to originate from the vapor space of the rail cars.  
Thus, only vapor releases were considered as none of the materials evaluated could produce 
liquid via retrograde condensation.  Figures 6, 7, and 8 show the dispersion behavior of the 
liquefied gases following a vertical vapor release.  As can be seen by reviewing the figures, the 
higher pressure system (propane) produces a longer flammable cloud.  However, none of the 
clouds drift back to grade with a flammable concentration.  
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Figure 8.  n-Butane Vapor Vertical Release 
 
 Since the four crude oils and ethanol releases do not have any internal tank pressure to 
“push” the vapors upward out of the 2-inch hole, no significant flammable vapor cloud is 
formed.  A summary of the grade level flammable zone impacts is presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 5.  Distance (ft) to Ground Level LFL Following 










DNE DNE DNE DNE DNE DNE DNE DNE 
DNE = Does Not Exist 
 
Extent of Radiant Impacts Following a Release from the Vapor Space – Ambient 
Conditions 
 
 If the flammable vapor released vertically from a 2-inch hole in the vapor space of a rail 
car were to ignite, there could be ground level radiant impacts due to the vertical torch fire.  
As described earlier, only the vapor releases from the vapor space of a liquefied gas rail car 
produce any significant flammable vapor.  If any of the vertical vapor releases were to ignite, 
only those associated with the liquefied gas rail cars produce a ground level radiant impact above 
















0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0
Momentum Jet Cloud
CONCENTRATION CONTOURS: SIDE VIEW
n-Butane railcar - 2-inch hole, vapor, vertical
      
D stability
windspeed = 10.0 mph
casename=nc42hv








Table 6.  Distance (ft) at Ground Level to 1,600 Btu/hr-ft2 From Torch Fire Following 










55 35 35 DNE DNE DNE DNE DNE 
DNE = Does Not Exist 
 
Consequences Associated with a Release During Fire Conditions 
 
 The term “Fire Conditions” is used in the following manner.  During or immediately after 
a rail accident (e.g., derailment) a local fire ensues that increases both the temperature and 
internal pressure in the rail cars affected by the fire.  In order to keep the apples-to-apples 
comparison in place, the following conditions were reached for each fluid. 
 
• Assume the 2-inch hole in the rail car does not occur until the internal pressure in the rail 
car reaches ~80 psia. 
• For the multicomponent crude oils, assume the temperature of the oil is ~380°F when the 
release starts. 
• For the n-butane and ethanol (pure components), let the temperature of the fluid equal the 
equilibrium temperature at 80 psia. 
• For the propane and the 50/50 propane/n-butane mix, the 80 psia pressure is below the 
vapor pressure of propane at ambient conditions and near the vapor pressure of the 50/50 
LPG mix of 76 psia.  Thus, the release behavior for these materials under fire conditions 
is nearly the same as the release behavior under ambient conditions. 
 
Raising the internal temperature and pressure in the rail cars allows each of the materials 
to produce a flashing liquid stream out of the 2-inch hole in the liquid space.  The release rates of 
n-butane, the four crude oils, and ethanol are presented in Figures 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14.  
The release curves for the four crude oils (Figures 10, 11, 12, and 13) show a slow decline in 
release rate as the vaporizing light ends in the oil try to maintain the pressure above the liquid.  
Of the four crude oils, only the Bakken-S (RVP = 11.3 psia) shows the potential for aerosol 
formation and only at a low rate. 
 
Extent of Flash Fires Following a Release from the Liquid Space – Fire Conditions 
 
While it is difficult to identify a situation where there is a nearby continuous fire and a 
dispersing flammable gas cloud that does not ignite, the calculations were completed in order to 
compare the flash fire zones.  With the generation of vapor during the release process, all six of 
the materials generate a momentum jet cloud that dominates the dispersion calculations to the 
LFL concentration of the material.  These results are presented in Table 7.  The results for the 
propane and 50/50 propane/n-butane mix are not applicable since 80 psia is below or near the 
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Table 7.  Distance (ft) to LFL Following 










NA NA 375 135 250 135 135 240 
--- --- MJ MJ MJ MJ MJ MJ 
NA = Not Applicable (similar to ambient condition release) 
MJ = Momentum Jet Source 
 
Extent of Radiant Impacts Following a Release from the Liquid Space – Fire Conditions 
 
 If the fluid released from the 2-inch hole were to ignite, two potential radiant hazards 
could exist.  If enough vapor were generated to sustain a torch fire, a slowly receding torch flame 
would exist.  These impacts are presented in Table 8.  Note that even under the elevated 
temperatures and pressures defined by the fire conditions, the crude oils are not volatile enough 
to generate a continuous flammable vapor stream leaving the 2-inch hole.  The ethanol release 
does produce enough flammable vapor to support a torch fire.  The propane and 50/50 
propane/n-butane releases produce similar impacts to the ambient condition releases. 
 
Table 8.  Distance (ft) to Ground Level 1,600 Btu/hr-ft2 From Torch Fire Following 










NA NA 195 NV NV NV NV 150 
NA = Not Applicable (similar to ambient condition release) 
NV = Not Volatile Enough to Generate Torch Fire 
 
 If the liquid leaving the 2-inch hole reaches grade and ignition occurs, a pool fire can 
ensue.  For the crude oils this remains the primary hazard associated with their release.  This is 
shown in Table 9.  The results for the four crude oils are similar just as their burning 
characteristics are similar.  Ethanol’s ability to form a torch fire results in the torch fire impacts 
being larger than the pool fire impacts,  The n-butane release under the elevated temperature and 
pressure conditions does not result in liquid to the ground (see Figure 9), thus a pool fire is not 
possible. 
 
This torch fire and pool fire behavior can be demonstrated following a review of 
Figures 15 and 16.  Figure 15 shows an ignited ethanol release following a rail accident and 
ignition of ethanol vapor in New Brighton, PA.  While more than one rail car released ethanol 
during the accident, the primary hazard associated with the accident was a continuous fire. 
  
Table 9.  Distance (ft) to 1,600 Btu/hr-ft2 From Pool Fire Following 










DNE DNE DNE 75 75 75 75 55 
DNE = Does Not Exist 
 
 Figure 16 shows a pool fire following a release of Bakken crude in a rail accident that 
occurred in Lynchburg, VA.  Here the pool fire, enveloped in thick black smoke typical of a 




 In order to generate a fireball involving a rail car (DOT-112 or DOT-111), a catastrophic 
failure of the rail car must occur.  The mechanism by which the failure may develop could be 
different for pressure cars (DOT-112) and crude cars (DOT-111).  The failure mechanism may 
vary from accident to accident as well as the design of the rail car.  However, the overall time 
line of the failure follows the path presented in Figure 17.  Figure 17 assumes that the pressure 
relief valve (PRV) is in working order.  If the PRV is damaged in the accident and not fully 
operable, the blue line demonstrating the operation of the PRV would be different from the 
figure, but the overall time line would be similar. 
 
The behavior demonstrated in Figure 17 is most often associated with Boiling Liquid 
Expanding Vapor Explosions (BLEVEs).  BLEVEs are commonly associated with pressure cars 
(DOT-112) or other pressure vessels.  The size and duration of a fireball following a catastrophic 
failure of a DOT-112 rail car has been modeled by relating the size and duration to the mass of 
fuel involved.  This approach has worked well and is documented in the literature [6, 7, 8, 9]. 
 
An example of a BLEVE of a propane rail car is presented in Figure 18.  The BLEVE 
model contained in CANARY matches the fireball size and duration well. 
 
The same type of approach for  modeling the size and duration of a fireball associated 
with a pressure vessel (e.g., DOT-112) can be used to model the size and duration of a fireball 
generated by a vessel with a lower pressure rating (e.g. DOT-111).  There have been catastrophic 
failures of some DOT-111 rail cars transporting crude oil and ethanol.  Two are presented in 
Figures 19 and 20.  Figure 19 shows the fireball formed following the catastrophic failure of a 
rail car carrying Bakken crude, while Figure 20 shows the fireball formed following the 






Figure 15.  New Brighton, PA (ethanol) 
 
 
Figure 16.  Lynchburg, VA (Bakken) 
  
 
Figure 17.  Time Line for a Fire-Induced Catastrophic Vessel Failure 
 
 
Figure 18.  Crescent City, IL (Propane) – Fireball  
































Figure 20.  Plenva, MT (ethanol) – Fireball 
  
To model these fireballs, using the available modeling methodology, several assumptions 
have to be made.  The most important of these is, “At what pressure does the catastrophic failure 
occur?”  For the purposes of this analysis, the failure pressure is defined as follows. 
 
 P(failure) = 120% of relief valve set pressure (gauge) 
 
For the DOT-112 rail cars, the relief valve set pressure is assumed to equal 280.5 psig 
For the DOT-111 rail cars, the relief valve set pressure is assumed to equal 85 psig 
 
 It should be noted that there is much more variability in the relief valve set pressure for 
the DOT-111 rail cars than for the DOT-112 rail cars.  However, for the purpose of the 
apples-to-apples comparison, all the fluids transported in DOT-111 rail cars were assumed to be 
equipped with 85 psig relief valves. 
 
 Using the fireball model within CANARY and the physical properties of the eight fluids 
described above, and assuming all the rail cars have 33,600 gallon water capacity.  The fireball 
hazard impact results are presented in Table 10.  Unlike the torch and pool fire models that 
assume a steady state flame, even for a short period of time, the fireball model allows for the 
fireball to grow and shrink and rise during its life.  Thus, a methodology that allows the resultant 
fireballs to be compared is based on the integrated radiant dosage necessary to cause a fatality 
(the 1% fatality level is often thought of as the “onset of fatality”).  This is developed from a 
probit equation.  The results presented in Table 10 show how far the fireball impact will extend.  
 
Table 10.  Distance (ft) to Integrated Radiant Flux Causing 1% Fatality From Fireball Following 










690 700 695 305 335 305 305 550 
 
 Defining the fluid temperature and pressure at the moment of vessel failure, defines the 
fluid density and flash fraction which in turn defines the mass available for consumption in the 
fireball.  The variation in mass, due to the fluid properties, at elevated temperature and pressure, 
is the primary driving force in the results presented in Table 10.   
 
 Using the same model, the fireball size and duration of each fireball is computed and 
summarized in Table 11.  As can be seen, none of the fireballs last longer than about 15 seconds.  
While these events are exciting, they often require a period of time of flame impingement 
(allowing the pressure and temperature in the vessel to build).  Thus, evacuation plans for the 
immediate area can be employed. 
  














D 670 680 675 405 430 405 405 750 




Flash fires, torch fires, and pool fires generate localized overpressure (a deflagration) caused by 
the combustion of flammable vapor and air.  For the materials that are the subject of this 
analysis, this overpressure is too low to cause any serious injury to persons or significant damage 
to structures.   
 
That leaves catastrophic failures and flammable vapors in confined or congested spaces as the 
potential sources of energy available to produce significant overpressure.  While press reports 
and descriptions of accidents often begin with “An explosion occurred …”, are explosions really 
important factors in identifying the magnitude of hazards associated with the rail transport of 
liquefied gases, crude oils, and ethanol?  Based on the following quotes from researchers and 
evidence from rail accidents, the answer is no. 
 
The explosion overpressure model is based on the premise that the strength of the blast wave 
generated by a vapor cloud explosion (VCE) is dependent on the reactivity of the flammable gas 
involved; the presence (or absence) of structures such as walls or ceilings that partially confine 
the vapor cloud; and the spatial density of obstructions within the flammable cloud [10, 11], 
the average size of those obstacles, and the overall size of the vapor cloud [12, 13, 14, 15].  
Quest’s model reflects the results of several international research programs on vapor cloud 
explosions, which show that the strength of the blast wave generated by a VCE increases as the 
degree of confinement and/or obstruction of the cloud increases.  The following quotations 
illustrate this point for propane and butanes. 
 
“On the evidence of the trials performed at Maplin Sands, the deflagration 
[explosion] of truly unconfined flat clouds of natural gas or propane does not 
constitute a blast hazard.”  [16]  (Tests conducted by Shell Research Ltd., in the 
United Kingdom.) 
 
“Both in two- and three-dimensional geometries, a continuous accelerating flame 
was observed in the presence of repeated obstacles.  A positive feedback 
mechanism between the flame front and a disturbed flow field generated by the 
flame is responsible for this.  The disturbances in the flow field mainly concern 
flow velocity gradients.  Without repeated obstacles, the flame front velocities 
reached are low both in two-dimensional and three-dimensional geometry.”  [17]  
(Tests conducted by TNO in the Netherlands.) 
 
Researchers who have studied case histories of accidental vapor cloud explosions have reached 
similar conclusions for medium reactivity materials. 
 
“It is a necessary condition that obstacles or other forms of semi-confinement are 
present within the explosive region at the moment of ignition in order to generate 
an explosion.”  [18, 19] 
 
“A common feature of vapor cloud explosions is that they have all involved 
ignition of vapor clouds, at least part of which have engulfed regions of repeated 
obstacles.”  [20] 
 
As all of the materials analyzed in this paper would fall into the medium reactivity category, the 
maximum overpressure achieved by a VCE in an open area would be about 0.4 psi.  Since the 
explosion overpressure modeling is site specific, it is generally not conducted on a generic basis.  
However, it is instructive to review an accident in order to identify whether explosion 




Around 1:15 a.m. on Saturday, July 6, 2013, an unattended train hauling Bakken crude derailed 
in the town of Lac Megantic, Quebec province, Canada.  Many of the DOT-111 rail cars released 
Bakken crude during and after the derailment.  The derailment occurred on a curve in the rail line 
and the contour of the surrounding ground allowed the oil to travel downhill in a south south-
westerly direction.  Most of the structures destroyed were in the path of the flowing, burning oil. 
 
Many of the initial reports described “explosions” of rail cars involved in the derailment.  While 
the catastrophic failure of a DOT-111 rail car was earlier shown to have the ability to produce a 
fireball, can any significant amount of overpressure be associated with such an event?  A review 
of Figure 21 indicates no.  The church shown in the photograph (Ste-Agnès Church) has multiple 
stained glass windows facing the derailment site.  The photograph does not show any damage to 
these windows.  In addition, other structures in the photograph do not show glass breakage.  
Since glass can break at overpressures in the range of 0.15 psi, it does not appear that significant 




A review of the types and extents of possible hazards associated with the rail transport of eight 
common fluids was accomplished by developing an apples-to-apples comparison.  To the extent 
possible, this paper sought to put the extent of potential hazards from the various rail car 
commodities in the proper perspective to one another.  It is important to keep in mind that the 
relative frequency of the analyzed events was not included in this review, thus a risk-based 
comparison cannot be accomplished with the data presented in this paper alone. 
  
 
Figure 21.  Lac Megantic Ste-Agnès Church 
 
Several conclusions can be made following this review. 
 
• The primary hazard associated with all eight commodities transported in rail cars is 
exposure to fire radiation. 
• The fire radiation impacts are larger for liquefied gas rail cars than for crude oil or 
ethanol rail cars. 
• Fireballs involving crude oils and ethanol are possible when DOT-111 rail cars are used. 
• In total, the hazard extents from ethanol rail cars are about the same as those of crude rail 
cars. 
• The vapor pressure of the crude in rail cars (defined by the Reid vapor pressure) does not 
play a significant role in the extent of the potential hazards associated with rail transport 
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